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Article 3

The Ethical Physician as
Negative Gatekeeper?
by
Michael Manning, M.D.

The author practiced gastroenterology for 13 years and is now a second year
theologian at SL Mary's Seminary and University, Baltimore, Maryland
Introduction

Many physicians today feel beleaguered. The medical marketplace is becoming
increasingly commercialized and controlled by large health insurance companies
that can dictate which physicians their members may see by virtue of their physician
panels. l These new marketplace dynamics along with a growing surplus of
physicians have induced many physicians to enroll as providers in Health
Maintenance Organizations. The primary care physicians in these organizations are
typicaIly obliged to serve as "gatekeepers" to the medical goods and services
provided by the insurance company. 2 Participation in such "managed care" often
places physicians in a role for which their medical training has ill-prepared them a role rife with conflicts of interest. Many physicians are angered by being asked to
abandon traditional patient<entered ethics for the sake of corporate and sometimes
personal profit. This paper examines current HMO gatekeeping practices and
concludes that unless significant reforms are made in the gatekeeping role, there is a
conflict of interest between ethical medical care and HMO gatekeeping. It descnbes
a model which has been proposed to reconcile the conflict between the needs of the
patients and the responsibility to society.
Medical Ethics and the Tradition Images of the Pbysician

The shaman was the physician's forerunner. In primitive cultures, the shaman
served as a combination of priest and medicine-man. He or she healed through
mystical, ecstatic and magical means using both ritual and psychoactive substances.
The shaman presided over many community liturgical functions. As medical
knowledge progressed, religious and medical roles came to be exercised by different
groups, the clergy and medical profession, respectively.3
Many still find priestly characteristics in the physicians' role. This is
understandable given its shamanic ancestry.4 The very word "profession" refers to
the profession of vows that signified entrance into a particular state of life. s
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Barnard6 argues that the physician's work resembles that of priests in three
important areas. First, the nature of illness is such that patients come to the
physician not only with biological distress, but with existential anxiety as well
(about death or disability, for example). They look to their physician for help in
dealing with both types of concern. Second, the therapeutic relationship
incorporates the physician's personal qualities of care and concern. The way in
which a physician carries out his or her role is an expression of who he or she is as a
person. Third, medical work, like that of ministry, is value laden both in its
individual and social contexts. The work a physician performs is linked to his or
her social and moral vision. Sound ethical codes are those that depend on
character. Professions invoke metaphors of family or monastery or military
colleagueship - in short, they appeal to character.'
May describes several images that have been used to portray the physician. s In
the image of physician as parent, we see the doctor as a beneficent, paternalistic,
authoritarian caregiver who knows what's best for the patient, even if the patient is
ignorant of his or her own best interests. This is one of the oldest and most revered
images ofthe physician and has given a heavy paternalistic tone to medical ethics.
The physician has also been seen as a fighter of disease and death, sometimes at
all costs. A term like medical armamentarium comes from the tendency to view
the physician as a combatant against disease. A physician's exhaustive use of every
last treatment to forestall death may also be inherited from this tradition.
The physician can also be seen as a provider of healing technology or
information. The depersonalized, commercialized and specialized nature of
modem medicine has contributed to this perception of the physician. The modern
emphasis on patient autonomy also fosters this image of the physician. The
physician-patient relationship is reduced to an interaction between consumer and
provider.
Finally, the physician can be seen as covenanter; this is the image May finds
most cogent. The covenant model recognizes those elements of the health care
relationship that cannot be defined by contract. The relationship entered into by
doctor and patient binds them both together in ways that differ from a simple
business relationship. In a coventantal relationship, the more powerful of the
parties agrees to accept some responsibility for the more vulnerable of the two
partners. The covenant does not give free reign to self-interest, subject only to
caveat emptor. A covenant based ethics encourages professional self-regulation
and discipline, equitable distnbution of health care goods and services, and a
pervasive sense of fidelity to all aspects of the physician-patient interaction.9
Some features of a covenant are also contained in the notion of a fiduciary
relationship, which has gained more widespread acceptance than the idea of
covenant. A fiduciary relationship is a form of paternalism for which beneficence
is the governing principle; it emphasizes the trustworthiness of the professional - a
trustworthiness that can, in principle, be relied upon. 10
The physician is also seen as a businessperson. This view of medical practice
promotes patient autonomyll and counters the heavy-handed paternalism ofthe
traditional doctor-patient relationship. There are two categories of patient
autonomy models: the consumer model and the contract model. 12 In the consumer
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model, the patient shops for medical goods and services just as he or she would for
any other commodity and purchases them from the physician. The physician has
the duty to obtain informed consent, perform the services competently, and in all
ways facilitate the patient's elf-determiniation. In the contract model, the physician
and patient enter into an agreement that is binding on both parties, the ethics of
each arrangement will vary from relationship to relationship. Third parties have
little or no right to interfere with the agreement between the physician and the
patient. Both the contract and the consumer models are legalistic, tend to minimize
mutual responsibility and are based on patient autonomy. As modem medical
transactions become increasingly businesslike, some have advocated applying the
principles of business ethics to medicine. They advocate the use of codes that have
been developed to handle conflicts of interest in the legal profession in the medical
profession as well. Most disputes or conflicts then become matters of contract law
rather than ethics l3 .
There are those who see the physician as a "zealous advocate" for the patient in
a health care system which is confusing and sometimes inimical to the patients'
best interests. Morris 14 likens a physician treating his patient in the present health
care delivery system to an attorney representing the best interests of his client in a
courtroom. Several authors who write on the issue of health care reform find
power in this analogy.
Principles of Medical Ethics

Since ethical behaviors vary greatly depending on which image of physician
one envisions, effort was directed at elucidating general principles of medical
ethics that transcend the individual models. Several principles were outlined
which have become classic in the medical ethics literature. These general
principles are beneficence, nonmaleficence,justice and autonomy.IS While these
principles have been powerful tools in the hands of medical ethicists, their strict
application lacks a consideration of the character of the physician and respect for
the individuality and autonomy of the patient. Shortcomings in the use of these
principles when analyzing medical decision making has led to various attempts to
hierarchically arrange the principles, or alternatively ground medical ethics in
virtue theory, feminism, casuistry or experience. 16
Virtue Theory Grounded in the Physician-Patient Relationship
Is there a theory of medical ethics that transcends the role models and yet allows
for more human characteristics, than strict principlaism? Pellegrino and
Thomasma have proposed an ethical theory grounded in the dynamic healing
relationship between physician and patient. 17
Pellegrino and Thomasma define the healing relationship as the essential
dynamic in medicine that distinguishes it from all other professions. They descn"be
five unique features of this relationship that characterize the "internal morality" of
medicine l8 . First, patients are autonomous, but vulnerable individuals when
seeking medical care. Their illness has robbed them of a certain degree of freedom,
and they approach the physician as one who has the knowledge and skill to restore
it. The inequality of this transaction imposes de facto moral obligations on the
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physician to protect the vulnerable patient from exploitation. Second, the
relationship is fiduciary in nature. Patients may be alert consumers and intelligently
question the physician, but at some point they must simply trust that the physician
can and will help them. They must trust that the physician will act out of something
other than self-interest. Third, medicine is both art lmd a science. M~ serious
medical decisions entail moral decisions as well. The character and beliefs of the
physician play an important role in shaping what both patient and physician view as
being in the patient's own good. Fourth, medical knowledge is not proprietary.
Society not only finances the research and teaching of medical knowledge, but allows
violations of privacy and human dignity to secure it, and thereby gains a stake in its
ownership and use. Finally, the attending physician is the "final common pathway"
for whatever happens to a patient. There can be no medical or moral buck-passing in
this regard, even when ethics committees or HMO policies and procedures are
involved.
After describing these unique characteristics of the medical healing relationship,
Pellegrino and Thomasma define the nature of the physician-patient relationship as
teleological, i.e. oriented toward the patient's goals. The long term goal is health
(conceived broadly); the short term goal is cure, or at least amelioration of the disease
and its consequences. From the teleological nature of relationship and from the
five-fold internal morality of medicine, Pellegrino and Thomasma derive principles
that ought to govern this relationship. Among such principles are beneficence,
non maleficence, patient autonomy and justice. The concomitant virtues of fidelity,
phronesis (prudence), justice, fortitude, integrity and self-etIacement (the list is not
exhaustive) can be derived in tum from these principles.19 This model is an important
attempt to link principles and virtues and ground them in the nature of the
physician-patient relationship. It will offer important advantages in the analysis of
conflicts of interest.
The Gatekeeper

The erosion of the paternalistic model of medical practice and the rise of the
autonomous patient model, along with the demand by insurance carriers to control
medical costs, spurred the gatekeeping method of health care delivery. The priority of
the medical doctor, as seen from the insurance companies' point of view, shifted from
"do anything that will help" the patient to "do only what will help20."
De facto Gatekeeping

Pellegrino and Thomasma descnbe three types of gatekeeping performed by
physicians.21 First is de facto gatekeeping. In practicing medicine, the physician
recommends tests, procedures, hospitalizations, etc. to meet the patient's needs.
When the physician does so, the physician is obliged. to ensure that the tests are
effective and beneficial. The tests must yield information useful to the particular
patient and the recommended procedures or therapies must alter the course of the
disease. The physician remains the patient's advocate while performing this de facto
role. The physician is obliged to obtain tests and use treatments that are beneficial to
the patient, and not to restrict access for purely financial or economic reasons.
Many believe the role of de facto gatekeeper, when ethically performed, entails
18
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no conflict with the patient's good. Economics and ethi~ individual and social
good, and doctors' and patients' interests are all in congruence.
Others are not so sanguine. They hold that the incentive to perform testing
enters the medical relationship the moment a fee for service is demanded. The
financial inducement this provides to perform testing has been disastrous for the
health care delivery system. Critics contend that physicians have disregarded the
good of the patient and society and have overutilized medical resources to their
own economic advantage. Physicians are in the enviable position of
recommending services and being the very people to profit from their
performance.
The physician cannot escape this type of gatekeeping, however. It is in the very
nature of medical practice to make recommendations for or against testing and
therapy. Even the way a physician budgets his or her time can be seen as a form of
gatekeeping.

Positive Gatekeeping
A second type of gatekeeping is positive gatekeeping. In positive gatekeeping,
the physician purposefully enhances profits and increases utilization of medical
resources22• The physician acts like a salesperson who markets medical skills and
services and attempts to reach the broadest segment of the population possIble.
Many condemn this form of gatekeeping, and in its most egregious forms it smacks
of huckstering. There are many subtle forms of this conflict of interest in the new
medical economy, however. A form of positive gatekeeping is at issue in the
controversy over self-referral, (i.e. the referral of patients to facilities owned in
whole or part by the physician), fee-splitting and physician investment 23 The
complex financial arrangements between hospitals and physician groups, imaging
centers, diagnostic laboratories, etc. make it difficult for the individual practitioner
to be aware of potential conflicts in this area. Furthermore, as competition for
patients increases, some hospitals insist that physicians on their staff use that
hospital as their "primary" hospital in which to admit patients. This limits both the
physician's and the patient's freedom of choice.
The advertising practices of the HMO's need careful scrutiny. HMO advertising
tends to inflate patient expectations and may create demand for the very same
goods and serVices which its policies mean to limit Inflated expectations increase
the likelihood that patients will suspect the allegiance of a physician who impedes
access to an expected benefit (a subspecialty referral, for example).24
Negative Gatekeeping
A third type of gatekeeping2S has become popular with the success of HMO's in
the healthcare marketplace - negative gatekeeping.
Medicine's initial exposure to this type of gatekeeping came with the advent of
the diagnosis related groups (DRG) system for reimbursement of hospitals. A
hospital is paid a predetermined amount for a specific diagnosis, regardless of the
patient's length of stay in the hospital, or the cost of medical resources consumed
during the stay. Physicians were encouraged by hospitals to admit patients only
when absolutely necessary, deliver more efficient and more intensive hospital care,
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and discharge patients quickly. The hospital's profits were enhanced or
diminished, depending on the physician's efficiency. As long as the patients' DRG
diagnosis could be made to reflect their clinical conditions, there did not seem to be
a conflict of interest between patient and physician. Even so, the axiom of
discharging the patient "quicker and sicker" had validity according to critics of this
system. Under the DRG system, a rather cynical "gaming" of the diagnoses
developed as hospitals scrambled to obtain maximal financial reimbursement for
each admission.
A more broadly conceived negative gatekeeping mle is being fostered by the
HMOs for ambulatory patients. The physician's gatekeeping duty is to coordinate
and deliver medical care and minimire the use of diagnostic and therapeutic
interventions, especially the most expensive ones. The HMO designates the
primary care physician to perform this role. A chief feature of this form of
gatekeeping is the physician's responsibility to someone other than the patient for
his or her clinical decisions and their financial consequences. The physician is
urged to be "cost~fIective," many of the money saving measures are also said to
increase quality of care. The important feature is that a third party has entered the
physician-patient relationship. The physician's behavior is no longer governed
solely by his or her own ethics and responsibility to the patient; he or she is also
responsible to a third party, usually a profit-oriented insurance company. The
physician is held accountable as much for the quantity and cost of medical
resources he or she authorires as for their appropriateness and quality. When
financial incentives to physicians for limiting access to medical goods and services
are put in place, the conflict of interest between patient and physician becomes
even more acute. Now the physician has a financial incentive to withhold
diagnostic testing and therapies, including subspecialty referrals. In some plans, the
physician's reimbursement suffers for each subspecialty referral made26.
Marcia Angell decries the "double agent" status of physicians who are forced
into this dilemma. 27 The negative gatekeeping role of the physician comes from a
comparatively recent belief among social planners and many physicians
themselves that the physician has a responsibility not only to deliver medical care
to the patient, but to conserve and wisely allocate society's scarce medical
resources as well. ANgell believes the incentives to ration medical care which
places physicians in this double bind are primarily economic and were initiated by
third party payers who reacted against increasing expenditures and widening
deficits.
In Angell's view, there are three reasons cited by proponents of negative
physician gatekeeping. First, society demands it as a cost saving measure. Second,
since insurance companies pay for most of the health care budget, they should
decide how the money is spent. Third, the physcian must act as a responsible
steward and allocate health care resources wisely. While she discounts the first two
arguments and finds some appeal in the third, she advocates instead eliminating
waste, "closing" the health care delivery system and applying the same rules
equally to all. Most importantly, she cites the double agent role as a conflict of
interest between "patient<entered" ethics and the insurance companies' (and
physicians') profits. She echoes the sentiments of many physicians when she
20
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observes that sick people need and expect their doctor's single purpose to be to heal
them. While vigorously advocating reform of the health care system, she exhorts
physicians to eschew the role of double agent 28

Toward a Solution

Is there any hope for a solution to resolve the conflicts between the demand of the
negative gatekeeping role and the challenge to preserve medical professionalism?
One of the healthiest moves toward a positive solution has already begun - a
public discussion of the issues involved. Proposals toward ajust solution cannot be
the province of the medical profession alone, nor even worse, should they come
from the board rooms and stockholder's meetings of health care corporation. The
discussion must include professionals, patients, taxpayers (when not in the role of
patient), economists, ethicists and theologians. The proposals must edify the
professional character of the physician and reinforce, not assault, the doctor-patient
relationship.
Financial conflicts of interest for the physician, especially those that result from
negative gatekeeping roles must be minim ired. Direct financial incentives to deny
care or services must be avoided.29 The reimbursement policies of all major HMO's
should be scrutinized with this in mind. The American Medical Association and the
American College of Physicians are in a good position to undertake this task. If they
are careful to avoid self-serving behavior, they could become strong advocates for
patients against the negative gatekeeping role. If the medical professional
organizations are unable or unwilling to undertake this review, public policy groups
should perform it
An HMO must fully disclose the potential conflicts of interest in which it places
its physicians. Critics of HMO's suggest that the HMO's select their hospitals based
on discounts provided to their members, not quality; that they hinder their patient's
access to specialists, and debberately cater to generally healthy people who require
fewer services. They contend that companies indue physicians to make decisions
based on what's good for the company rather than what's good for the patient. 30
Lawsuits have begun to be brought which allege the negative gatekeeping
inducements offered by the HMO contnbuted to the malpractice of their primary
physician. 31 Forcing companies to disclose physicians' reimbursement
formulas to its patient-members, may encourage the development of financial
reimbursement that does not aggravate the conflict of interest inherent in the
negative gatekeeping role. 32
The framework suggested by Pellegrino and Thomasma of a virtue-based ethic
grounded in the healing relationship between physician and patient offers
advantages here. Medical decision-making in a climate which must respect patient's
rights, yet be socially responsible, will always be difficult It may be posstble to
broaden the principle and virtue of medical justice, a constitutive element in all
models of medical ethics, to include its social and distnbutive components. Since
Pellegrino's model is grounded in the physician-patient healing relationship,
adequate safeguards for the patient should be ensured as society struggles with the
notion of what distnbutive justice for health care resources is.33 Consensus on the
issue of distributive justice is certainly difficult to achieve . In
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morally pluralistic societies, there may be no agreed upon definition ofjustice.34
There may also be a discrepancy between what we want as taxpayers and what we
desire when we or members of our families are patients.
By whatever means societal and financial concerns are introduced into the
physician-patient relationship, they radically change the clincial encounter. These
changes are hard to justify unless serious efforts are made to control waste and
disproportionate profits in the health care delivery system.3S If public planners
insist on comparing the health care budget to the gross national products as a
measurement of whether it is excessive, a realistic look needs to be taken at the
sums spent on harmful substances like tobacco, cosmetics, advertising, etc.
We can do much to rescue medical ethics. 36 UI).til more widespread health care
reform occurs, we must avoid putting physicians in the role of double agency.37
Condemning direct financial incentives to withhold care and advocating38, even
legislating, full disclosure of HMO physician reimbursement policies to members,
are but two of the steps which can be taken in the interim. Pellegrino and
Thomasma's model can serve as a framework within which to continue the
discussion about health care reform, and may facilitate the development of more
clinically relevant medical ethics. The ethical physician of character can still be
guided by the virtues traditionally inherent in the doctor-patient relationship
(compassion, honesty, trustworthiness, confidentiality, etc.). Developing societal
notions of commutative and distributive justice will help rescue the therapeutic
relationship from conflict of interest.39 Since justice is both a virtue and a principle,
overarching principles might be found that apply universally, yet allow flexibility
for the individual physician to act justly as he or she sees fit. The virtues are applied
within a matrix oriented toward a healing relationship between patient and
physician. This ensures that the practice of virtue becomes neither too abstract nor
too individualistic.
The physician is not just a businessman or contracted employee. Whatever the
medical profession borrows from business and legal ethics must be examined
carefully. Most physicians and the general public still expect more of the medical
profession than do the leaders of U.s. health care corporations. We need to listen
to prophets like ReIman, Pellegrino and Angell, who challenge us to rescue the
best in the professional medical tradition even while we move ahead with health
care reform.
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